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Showing posts with label Hacking. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hacking. Show all posts

Zero-day Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.

Microsoft has released Customer Guidance for Reported #zeroday #Vulnerabilities in #Microsoft #Exchange Server. According to the blog post, “Microsoft is aware of limited targeted attacks using the two vulnerabilities to get into users’ systems.”



The two vulnerabilities are CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082, affecting on-premises Microsoft #Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 2019. Note: Microsoft Exchange Online is not affected. 

An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities to take control of an affected system.

The current Exchange Server #mitigation is to add a blocking rule in “IIS Manager -> Default Web Site -> URL Rewrite -> Actions” to block the known attack patterns how to do it is describe in the below microsoft  blogpost

https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/09/29/customer-guidance-for-reported-zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-exchange-server/

Optus data breach: what to do if you think you're at risk

On 22 September 2022, Optus published an article on its website, advising customers of a Cyberattack which may have resulted in unauthorised access to current and former customers’ information.

Optus has advised the information potentially exposed may include customers’ names, dates of  birth, phone numbers, email addresses, and, for a subset of customers, addresses, and ID document numbers such as driver license or passport numbers.
 
Payment detail and account  passwords have not been compromised.
 
Optus has advised that customers that had the most fields exposed would be contacted first over  the next few days. It is likely that if you are not contacted by Optus in the next few days, that you  are not in this cohort of individuals.

Please note that notification from Optus is occurring via email and Optus will not provide any links  in email or contact you via sms or phone call asking you to verify any personal details or billing  information. If you are contacted via SMS or phone, do not engage, contact Optus directly through  a verified point of contact.
 
If you have received an email, by Optus for data breach notification. By acting quickly, you can reduce your chance of experiencing harm.

how you can check exactly what data of yours might have been leaked. First log-in here: https://www.optus.com.au/ and then once logged-in, visit this link and you should see a JSON encoded response that contains your personal information. Check in particular the indentType [sic] field, which should tell you what kind of document has been exposed; and the indentValue [again, sic—who wrote this data schema?] which in my case tells me exactly which document I should get re-issued.

If you don’t mind jumping through a few hoops, you can also confirm what street address details might have been exposed. To do that, first write down the numeric contactId value from the JSON response you got above. Then take the following URL https://www.optus.com.au/mcssapi/rp-webapp-9-common/customer-management/contact-person/{contactId}?lo=en_US&sc=SS and copy and paste it into the address bar of your browser. Manually replace the part that says {contactId} with the numeric value you wrote down. It should return yet another JSON encoded response that includes street address information. This response for me also included the ID document information in the documentType and documentNumber fields, plus (worryingly) information that would seem to pertain to the expiration date of the document

 
It is vital to monitor for suspicious activity on your accounts and report any you see to the relevant provider. Be wary of any spam calls/texts/emails, even on social media, and never click on suspicious links.
 
Banks, government bodies, and other institutions make it a policy to never contact you over text, phone, or email asking for personal information. If you receive suspicious communications, do not hand out your details. You can contact the provider directly to follow up or check the ACCC's Scamwatch to see if similar frauds have occurred.
 
Optus has explicitly stated it will not be sending links in data breach emails, so if you receive an email from "Optus" with a "click here for more details" button, it's likely not from the telco. Although Optus advised the user password is not breached, As a precautionary measure there are proactive response actions we recommend that you may wish to consider:
 
  1. Changing your Optus email and account passwords. Make sure you have strong passwords that you haven’t used for other accounts. (if you use same password as your Optus to the other accounts before make sure to change them).
  2. When updating your internet banking passwords, go to the financial institution’s website directly by typing their web address into your web browser. Generally, a financial institution won’t ask you in an email to click on a link to update your password.
  3.  Enable two-factor authentication on all your accounts, especially mobile banking or money management apps. This helps protect your data since hackers need more than just your password to access your account.
  4.  You could also  make regular backups of your phone’s data to a secure hard drive.
  5. Monitor your account transactions online or using paper account statements if you receive them. If you spot any purchases you didn’t make, report these immediately to your financial institution.
  6. Place limits on your accounts or ask you bank how you can secure your money.
  7.  If you suspect fraud you can request a ban on your credit report.
  8. Change your Driver licence, Medicare and passport number if you received email from optus that your data is breached.

 
If you require more info you can follow the guides below
 
What to do if there is a data breach (oaic.gov.au)
Also consider the steps outlined in IDCARE Optus Data Breach Response Fact sheet.
 

Optus Telecom company got hacked

 


Now our own #Optus  got hacked.
#optus is investigating the possible unauthorised access of current and former customers’ information.

Upon discovering this, Optus immediately shut down the attack. Optus is working with the Australian Cyber Security Centre to mitigate any risks to customers. Optus has also notified the Australian Federal Police, the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner and key regulators.

Up to 3 million users have had all their data stolen, including passport numbers and birth dates. Information which may have been exposed includes customers’ names, dates of birth, phone numbers, email addresses, and, for a subset of customers, addresses, ID document numbers such as driver's licence or passport numbers.  Payment detail and account passwords have not been compromised.

Optus #services, including #mobile and home #internet, are not affected, and messages and voice calls have not been compromised. Optus services remain safe to use and operate as per normal.

Customers whos data that got hacked optus is yet to inform individual person.

No technical details on how the hack occuer is not published yet.

#cybersecurity #police #hacking #acsc #databreach #cyberattack #customerdata

Uber Got Hacked badly.

#Uber got hacked. The hack was successful because of  #socialengineering so be carefull when you receive #email or message check it out before clicking any link or giving away your login info etc.

Secondly change your Uber password, these are the two key takeway.

Now to the technical stuff,  The hacker claim they Social Engineered an employee then found admin credentials in a powershell script on a network share. As the hacker says

"One of the powershell scripts contained the username and password for a admin user in Thycotic (PAM) Using this i was able to extract secrets for all services, DA, DUO, Onelogin, AWS, GSuite"








Attacker basically got access to almost everything (allegedly)

- Slack
- Google Workspace Admin
- AWS Accounts
- HackerOne Admin
- SentinelOne EDR
- vSphere
- Financial Dashboards

Don’t point and laugh. It could be you next time. Focus on your IT security and employee training on Social Engineering.


** Also another key point if you capable speand and invest in people early not after the breach as we seen so many cases


Good Luck.



#hacked #hacker #password #credentials #user #powershell #aws #share #uber #vsphere #slack #gsuite #sentinelone

Evil PLC Attack: Using a Controller as Predator Rather than Prey

Team82 has developed a novel attack that weaponizes programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in order to exploit engineering workstations and further invade #OT and enterprise networks. They’re calling this the Evil #PLC Attack. 



The attack targets engineers working every day on industrial networks, configuring and troubleshooting #PLCs to ensure the safety and reliability of processes across critical industries such as utilities, electricity, water and wastewater, heavy industry, manufacturing, and automotive, among others.

The Evil #plc  Attack research resulted in working proof-of-concept exploits against seven market-leading automation companies, including Rockwell Automation, Schneider Electric, GE, B&R, XINJE, OVARRO, and Emerson.

The Evil PLC Attack turns the PLCs into the tool rather than the target. By weaponizing one PLC, an attacker may in turn compromise the engineer’s workstation, which is the best source for process-related information and would have access to all the other PLCs on the network. With this access and information, the attacker can easily alter the logic on any PLC. 

The trick would be to lure an engineer to connect to a compromised PLC; the quickest way is to cause a fault on the PLC. That is a typical scenario an engineer would respond to, and connect using their engineering workstation application as a troubleshooting tool. 

Full report here https://claroty.com/team82/blog/evil-plc-attack-using-a-controller-as-predator-rather-than-preyhttps://claroty.com/team82/blog/evil-plc-attack-using-a-controller-as-predator-rather-than-prey

#plcprogramming #plcscada #otsecurity #cyber #scada #ot #itsecurity  #cybersecurity #redteam #pentest #pentesting #hacking #hackers #coding   #malware

#utilities #electricity #water  #wastewater #heavyindustry #manufacturing #automotive

Google Hacking :-

Basic Operators:-
1) And (+) :- This operator is used to include multiple terms in a query which is to be searched in google.
example:- if we type "hacker+yahoo+science" in google search box and click search, it will reveal the results something which are related to all the three words simultaneously i.e. hacker, yahoo and science.

2 ) OR (|) :- The OR operator, represented by symbol( | ) or simply the word OR in uppercase letters, instructs google to locate either one term or another term in a query.

3) NOT :- It is opposite of AND operator, a NOT operator excludes a word from search.
example:- If we want to search websites containing the terms google and hacking but not security then we enter the query like "google+hacking" NOT "security".


Advanced Operators:-
1) Intitle :- This operator searches within the title tags.
examples:- intitle:hacking returns all pages that have the string "hacking" in their title.

intitle:"index of" returns all pages that have string "index of" in their title.

Companion operator:- "allintitle".

2) Inurl :- Returns all matches, where url of the pages contains given word.
example:- inurl:admin returns all matches, where url of searched pages must contains the word "admin".

Companion operator:- "allinurl".

3) Site :- This operator narrows search to specific website. It will search results only from given domain. Can be used to carry out information gathering on specific domain.
example:- site:www.microsoft.com will find results only from the domain www.microsoft.com

4) Link :- This operator allows you to search for pages that links to given website.
example:- link:www.microsoft.com
Here, each of the searched result contains asp links to www.microsoft.com

5) Info :- This operator shows summary information for a site and provides links to other google searches that might pertain to that site.
example:- info:www.yahoo.com

6) Define :- This operator shows definition for any term.
example:- define:security
It gives various definitions for the word "security" in different manner from all over the world.

7) Filetype :- This operator allows us to search specific files on the internet. The supported file types can be pdf, xls, ppt, doc, txt, asp, swf, rtf, etc..
example:- If you want to search for all text documents presented on domain www.microsoft.com then we enter the query something like following.
"inurl:www.microsoft.com filetype:txt"


POPULAR SEARCH:
Google Search :- "Active Webcam Page" inurl:8080 Description- Active WebCam is a shareware program for capturing and sharing the video streams from a lot of video devices. Known bugs: directory traversal and cross site scripting.

Google Search :- "delete entries" inurl:admin/delete.asp Description- AspJar contains a flaw that may allow a malicious user to delete arbitrary messages. The issue is triggered when the authentication method is bypassed and /admin/delete.asp is accessed directly. It is possible that the flaw may allow a malicious user to delete messages resulting in a loss of integrity.

Google Search :- "phone * * *" "address *" "e-mail" intitle:"curriculum vitae"
Description- This search gives hundreds of existing curriculum vitae with names and address. An attacker could steal identity if there is an SSN in the document.

Google Search :- intitle:"index of" finance.xls Description- Secret financial spreadsheets 'finance.xls' or 'finances.xls' of companies may revealed by this query.

Google Search :- intitle:"index.of" robots.txt Description- The robots.txt file contains "rules" about where web spiders are allowed (and NOT allowed) to look in a website's directory structure. Without over-complicating things, this means that the robots.txt file gives a mini-roadmap of what's somewhat public and what's considered more private on a web site. Have a look at the robots.txt file itself, it contains interesting stuff. However, don't forget to check out the other files in these directories since they are usually at the top directory level of the web server!

Google Search :- intitle:index.of.admin Description- Locate "admin" directories that are accessible from directory listings.

Google Search :- inurl:"nph-proxy.cgi" "start browsing" Description- Returns lots of proxy servers that protects your identity online.

DNS Logs Anomaly Hunting Checklist for Security and SOC Analyst

 

DNS Logs Anomaly Hunting Checklist for SOC Analyst

 

 


Check for the hosts with a high volume of uncommon record types (TXT, NULL, CNAME, etc.)

 

• Command and control channels may utilize specific DNS records such as ( TXT and CNAME requests ) to execute malware.

 

• Explore Top Level Domains, TLDs (.xyz, .me, .biz, etc ), and TLDs for geographical regions in which your organization does not regularly operate.

 

• The proliferation of TLDs has made it easier for attackers to continually add new domains to their infrastructure to evade threat intel lists, as well as register doppelganger domains for common websites.

 

• Inbound/ Outbound Requests for TLDs of geographical regions outside of your organization’s point of presence should be considered suspicious and reviewed, especially regions synonymous with cybercrime and anonymization.

 

• Aggregate and Filter on DNS application logs with the response code NXDOMAIN (domain does not exist) to review hosts seen with a high volume of DNS resolution failures.

 

• There are many benign reasons for failed DNS queries; however, the abnormal volume can be a strong indicator of possible threat activity. For example, malware utilizing Domain generation algorithms ( DGAs ) will cycle through multiple generated domains until a valid reply is received. Since most of the domains requested will not exist, it will generate a high volume of NXDOMAIN responses. In addition, abnormal NXDOMAIN volume could highlight hosts requesting malicious domains that are no longer active.

 

• Look for hosts with high DNS request volume for multiple subdomains of a single parent domain.

 

• A common method of communicating data is by including it in the query string itself in place of the subdomain (commonly encoded using Base64). Identifying requests of multiple suspicious subdomains for a specific domain could help to highlight this method of communication.

 

• Identify suspicious requests by reviewing queries of domains that are abnormally long, or domains with a high level of entropy.

 

• Hunting abnormal long queries with a high amount could help identify encoded data hidden in query strings as well as evidence of DGA domains.

 

• Review endpoints process names for any unusually named processes or processes that are not regularly seen generating logon requests.

 

• Attackers can simply register new domains to evade detection by threat intel lists. Identifying newly registered domains could help to easily identify suspicious activity.

 

• DNS fluxing is a technique used by attackers to hide an actual phishing or malware domain behind constantly changing compromised hosts (IP) which are acting as proxies. To accomplish this, the Time to Live (TTL) for DNS is set very low (close to 5 min) so that the changes made in DNS will reflect quickly over the internet. Because it is constantly changing, this makes it hard to identify, and take down the actual source.DNS query for a domain, having a TTL less than 5-10 mins, should be one way to hunt. Then getting different IP addresses for the same domain is also a way to hunt.

 

• Allowed Traffic on Port 53 Inbound Transition Control Protocol (TCP), zone transfer and should only be allowed between primary and secondary DNS servers. If zone transfer happens with an external IP/Domain which is considered as a high alert.

 

• DNS Should Not Query Unusual Destinations, this often indicates the potentially malicious traffic.

Kerberoasting Attack and Detection

Kerberoasting 

is a common attack used by malicious actors once access is gained to a organization's internal network and a domain account is compromised. Kerberoasting allows an attacker to elevate their privileges by gaining access to passwords for service accounts on the domain.



 

 

Key Points

• Using Kerberoasting  attacker extracts service account credential hashes from Active Directory for offline cracking by exploiting a combination of weak encryption and poor service account password.  

  • Kerberoasting is effective because an attacker does not require domain administrator credentials to pull off this attack and can extract service account credential hashes without sending packets to the target.

 

Detecting Kerbaroasting:

  • Event ID: 4768 (Kerberos TGS Request) The Account Domain field is DOMAIN FQDN when it should be DOMAIN.
  • Event ID “4769” with the vulnerable encryption RC4 “0x17” and “0x18” types in Kerberoasting and ticket option 0x40810000.

 

Elements of a Kerberoasting Attack

 

Here is how a Kerberoasting attack works in practice:

 

  • To begin with, an attacker compromises the account of a domain user. The user need not have elevated or “administrator” privileges. The attacker authenticates to the domain.
 
  • When the malicious  user is authenticated, they receive a ticket granting ticket (TGT) from the Kerberos key distribution center (KDC) that is signed by its KRBTGT service account in Active Directory.
 
  • Next, the malicious actor requests a service ticket for the service they wish to compromise. The domain controller will retrieve the permissions out of the Active Directory database and create a TGS ticket, encrypting it with the service’s password. As a result, only the service and the domain controller are capable of decrypting the ticket since those are the only two entities who share the secret.
 
  • The domain controller provides the user with the service ticket that is then presented to the service, which will decrypt it and determine whether the user has been granted permission to access the service. At this point, an attacker may extract the ticket from system memory, and crack it offline.
 
  • For password cracking, tools such as Impacket, PowerSploit and Empire contain features that automate the process: requesting service tickets and returning crackable ticket hashes in formats suitable for submission to cracking tools such as John the Ripper and Hashcat, which will pry plaintext credentials from vulnerable hashes.
 
 

 

 

Finding Golden and Silver Tickets

 

Purpose: Identify suspicious TGT (Golden) and TGS (Silver) tickets by comparing the MaxTicketAge from the domain policy to the difference in the StartTime and EndTime of the cached authentication ticket.

Data Required : Remote Access to collect susicious tickets OR

Schedule task to write possible bad tickets to application event log for log/SIEM review

Collection Considerations : Consider running local scripts and collecting the application event log rather than a scan to reduce noise See here

Analysis Techniques:Comparative time analysis of domain policy vs cached tickets

 

Identify suspicious TGT (Golden) and TGS (Silver) tickets  

 

  • Event ID: 4624 (Account Logon)
  • The Account Domain field is DOMAIN FQDN when it should be DOMAIN.
  • Event ID: 4672 (Admin Logon)
  • Account Domain is blank & should be DOMAIN.
  • Event ID: 4768 (Kerberos TGS Request)
  • The Account Domain field is DOMAIN FQDN when it should be DOMAIN.
  • The Account Domain field is blank when it should be DOMAIN
  •  The Account Domain field is DOMAIN FQDN when it should be DOMAIN.
  •  Account Name is a different account from the Security ID.

 

 

BloodHound

  • BloodHound is an Active Directory (AD) reconnaissance tool.
  • BloodHound outputs results as JSON files
  • BloodHound can collect information about the following objects (users, computers, groups, gpos)
  • BloodHound can archive collected a ZIP file
  • Hunt for Suspicious Process execution via Services.exe
  • Hunt for Suspicious Process Injection

Hacking , ATT&CK phase , kill chain and incident response phases

There are some common steps used by industry and most commons in Cyber field are listed below.

 HACKING Methodology (Steps) 

Footprinting (whois,nslookup) » 

Scanning (Nmap,fping) » 

Enumeration (dumpACL, showmount, Iegion, rpcinfo » 

Gaining Access(Tcpdump) »

Escalating Privilege(John the ripper, getadmin) »

Pilfering (Rhosts. userdata, configtile. registry) » 

Covering Tracks (zap, rootkits) »

Creating Backdoors (corn, at, startup folder, keylogger, rdp) »

Denial Of Service (synk4, ping Of death). 

 

MITRE ATT&CK:

Reconnaissance» 

Resource Development » 

Initial Access» Execution »

 Persistence »

 Privilege Escalation » 

Defense Evasion» 

Credential Access » 

Discovery »

 Lateral Movement »

 Collection »

Command and Control »

 Exfiltration»

 Impact.

 

CYBER KILL CHAN: 

Reconnaissance» 

Weaponization»

Delivery » 

Exploitation »

Installation »

Command and Control » 

Action and Objective .

 

Incident Response: 

Identify »  Protect »  Detect »  Respond»  Recover. 

SANS Incident Response:

 Preparation »  Identification»  Containment »  Eradication »  Recovery »  Lesson Learned

Web shells Detectting and Hardening servers against webshell


web shells and its Challenges in detecting 


Web shells can be built using any of several languages that are popular with web applications. Within each language, there are several means of executing arbitrary commands and there are multiple means for arbitrary attacker input. Attackers can also hide instructions in the user agent string or any of the parameters that get passed during a web server/client exchange.
 
When analyzing script, it is important to leverage contextual clues. For example, a scheduled task called “Update Google” that downloads and runs code from a suspicious website should be inspected more closely.

With web shells, analyzing context can be a challenge because the context is not clear until the shell is used. In the following code, the most useful clues are “system” and “cat /etc/passwd”, but they do not appear until the attacker interacts with the web shell:

Another challenge in detecting web shells is uncovering intent. A harmless-seeming script can be malicious depending on intent. But when attackers can upload arbitrary input files in the web directory, then they can upload a full-featured web shell that allows arbitrary code execution—which some very simple web shells do.

These file-upload web shells are simple, lightweight, and easily overlooked because they cannot execute attacker commands on their own. Instead, they can only upload files, such as full-featured web shells, onto web servers. Because of their simplicity, they are difficult to detect and can be dismissed as benign, and so they are often used by attackers for persistence or for early stages of exploitation.

Finally, attackers are known to hide web shells in non-executable file formats, such as media files. Web servers configured to execute server-side code create additional challenges for detecting web shells, because on a web server, a media file is scanned for server-side execution instructions. Attackers can hide web shell scripts within a photo and upload it to a web server. When this file is loaded and analyzed on a workstation, the photo is harmless. But when a web browser asks a server for this file, malicious code executes server side.

These challenges in detecting web shells contribute to their increasing popularity as an attack tool. We constantly monitor how these evasive threats are utilized in cyber attacks, and we continue to improve protections


Web shell: Finding Web Shells

Purpose: Identify web shells (stand-alone|injected)

Data Required : Web server logs (apache, IIS, etc.)

Collection Considerations : Collect from all webservers, and ensure that parameters are collected.

POST data should be collected.

• For apache consider using mod_security or mod_dumpio

• For IIS use Failed Request Tracing / Custom Logging

Analysis Techniques:

Look for parameters passed to image files (e.g., /bad.png?zz=ls

 

Web logs things to notice

    • User-Agent is rare

    • User-Agent is new

    • Domain is rare

    • Domain is new

    • High frequency of http connections

    • URI is same

    • URI varies but length is constant.

    • Domain varies but length is constant

    • Missing referrer

    • Missing or same referrer to multiple uri’s on single dest.

 

 

Endpoint detection strategies:

• Look for creation of processes whose parent is the webserver (e.g., apache, w3wp.exe); these will come from functions like:

○ PHP functions like exec(), shell_exec(), etc.

○ asp(.net) functions like eval(), bind(), etc.)

• Looking for file additions or file changes (if you have a change management process and schedule to easily differentiate 'known good') -- (using something like inotify on linux (or FileSystemWatcher in .NET), to monitor the webroot folder(s) recursively)

 

Other Notable things:

IIS instance (w3wp.exe) running commands like ‘net’, ‘whoami’, ‘dir’, ‘cmd.exe’, or ‘query’, to name a few, is typically a strong early indicator of web shell activity.

 

Look for suspicious process that IIS worker process (w3wp.exe), Apache HTTP server processes (httpd.exe, visualsvnserver.exe), etc. do not typically initiate (e.g., cmd.exe and powershell.exe)

 

Look for suspicious web shell execution, this can identify processes that are associated with remote execution and reconnaissance activity (example: “arp”, “certutil”, “cmd”, “echo”, “ipconfig”, “gpresult”, “hostname”, “net”, “netstat”, “nltest”, “nslookup”, “ping”, “powershell”, “psexec”, “qwinsta”, “route”, “systeminfo”, “tasklist”, “wget”, “whoami”, “wmic”, etc.)

 

lolbas:

    - rundll32.exe

    - dllhost.exe

    tools:

    - net.exe

    - powershell.exe

    - ipconfig.exe

    - CobaltStrike

    - BloodHound

    - nslookup.exe

 

execution:

        - "T1055.012 - Process Injection: Process Hollowing"

    - behavior: RUNDLL32 created ~20 instances of DLLHOST without command-line arguments.

      id: 1669ecb0-3a8a-4858-9efd-23e5c01ad643

      type: Process Created

      cmdLine:

      - C:\\Windows\\System32\\dllhost.exe

      process: C:\\Windows\\System32\\dllhost.exe

      parentProcess: C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe

 

Attackers need to execute tools. Look at Windows Event ID's 4688/592. Stack and look for outliers. Group by execution time and user."

 

Hardening servers against web shells

A single web shell allowing attackers to remotely run commands on a server can have far-reaching consequences. With script-based malware, however, everything eventually funnels to a few natural chokepoints, such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, and cscript.exe. As with most attack vectors, prevention is critical.

Organizations can harden systems against web shell attacks by taking these preventive steps:

  • Identify and remediate vulnerabilities or misconfigurations in web applications and web servers. Use Threat and Vulnerability Management to discover and fix these weaknesses. Deploy the latest security updates as soon as they become available.
 
  • Implement proper segmentation of your perimeter network, such that a compromised web server does not lead to the compromise of the enterprise network.
 
  • Enable antivirus protection on web servers. Turn on cloud-delivered protection to get the latest defenses against new and emerging threats. Users should only be able to upload files in directories that can be scanned by antivirus and configured to not allow server-side scripting or execution.
 
  • Audit and review logs from web servers frequently. Be aware of all systems you expose directly to the internet.
 
  • Utilize the Windows Defender Firewall, intrusion prevention devices, and your network firewall to prevent command-and-control server communication among endpoints whenever possible, limiting lateral movement, as well as other attack activities.
 
  • Check your perimeter firewall and proxy to restrict unnecessary access to services, including access to services through non-standard ports.
 
  • Practice good credential hygiene. Limit the use of accounts with local or domain admin level privileges.

Social Engineering Red flags and Email investigation

 

Social Engineering -

 A single individual or groups of people attempting to gain access to your systems by utilizing the following methods.

 

Relies on interaction with humans, tricked into handing over credentials - humans are the weakest link therefore they try Deceptive techniques into breaking in.

 


 

 Type of Social engineering Attacks :

  • Phishing - malicious email - sends a link
  • Spear-phishing - targets individuals or specific groups
  • Email spoofing - masquerading as someone else - appear as someone you think you know.
  • Baiting - entice victim to do something, leave a usb lying around.
  • Tailgating - gain access by following an employee through a door/gate.


Indicator or Red Flags to look for investigation:

 


 


Email Sphere phishing: In this email fraud the perpetrator will ask for confidential and sensitive information. This type of attack resembles with e-mail spoofing fraud but in here in almost all cases the sender is someone trustworthy with an authoritative position in the organization.

 

Business email compromise is when criminals use email to abuse trust in business processes to scam organizations out of money or goods.

 

The Email forensic investigator can use several header fields to trace the email but it can be broadly categorized into the following area of interest the investigator should look into:

Sender's SMTP Server (OUTGOING Mail Server) >>

 Encrypted mail header >> 

Typical To, From, Subject, and Date Lines >> 

Mail transfer email client information >>

Various X-header information added by different SMTP server and email clients during the whole email sending process.

 

Azure Well Architected Security Review Checklist

 Here We have compiled for you a checklist for Azure Security.


Priority: High Weight: 90

Item No 1: Classify your data at rest and use encryption
Item No 2: Implement Conditional Access Policies

Priority: High Weight: 70
Item No 3: Conduct periodic access reviews for the workload
Item No 4: Use only secure hash algorithms (SHA-2 family)
Item No 5: Discover and remediate common risks to improve Secure Score in Azure Security Center
Item No 6: Define a set of Azure Policies which enforce organizational standards and are aligned with the governance team
Item No 7: Use tools like Azure Disk Encryption, BitLocker or DM-Crypt to encrypt virtual disks
Item No 8: Deprecate legacy network security controls
Item No 9: Integrate network logs into a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)
Item No 10: Data in transit should be encrypted at all points to ensure data integrity
Item No 11: Establish a designated group responsible for central network management
Item No 12: Build a security containment strategy
Item No 13: Evolve security beyond network controls
Item No 14: Periodically perform external and/or internal workload security audits
Item No 15: Establish lifecycle management policy for critical accounts
Item No 16: Standardize on modern authentication protocols

Priority: Medium Weight: 60
Item No 17: Configure web apps to reuse authentication tokens securely and handle them like other credentials
Item No 18: Ensure security team has Security Reader or equivalent to support all cloud resources in their purview
Item No 19: Synchronize on-premises directory with Azure AD
Item No 20: Implement identity-based storage access controls
Item No 21: Design virtual networks for growth
Item No 22: Use standard and recommended encryption algorithms
Item No 23: Assign permissions based on management or resource groups
Item No 24: Add planning, testing, and validation rigor to the use of the root management group

Priority: Medium Weight: 50

Item No 25: Use managed identity providers to authenticate to this workload
Item No 26: Enforce password-less or Multi-factor Authentication (MFA)
Item No 27: Continuously assess and monitor compliance
Item No 28: Use identity services instead of cryptographic keys when available
Item No 29: Establish a designated point of contact to receive Azure incident notifications from Microsoft
Item No 30: Establish process and tools to manage privileged access with just-in-time capabilities
Item No 31: Implement role-based access control for application infrastructure

Priority: Medium Weight: 40
Item No 32: Implement resource locks to protect critical infrastructure.


 

Mimikaz


What is Mimikatz?

If you’re into penetration testing and windows red teaming then you might have probably heard of mimikatz, but in case you’re wondering or have heard of the tool but don’t know what it does, let’s see what is mimikatz.

Written in C-language, Mimikatz is a very powerful post-exploitation tool and as described by CrowdStrike CTO and Co-Founder, “The AK-47 of Cyber Attacks.” 

Some even claim mimikatz to be a Swiss Army Knife of Windows Credentials. Benjamin Delpy, who is the developer of this tool, claims that he created this tool to play with Windows Security. He maintains his own GitHub repository where he has provided the source code for the tool and updates it on a regular basis.

What can be done using Mimikatz?

Although known widely for credential dumping, this is not the only thing that it can do. 

Mimikatz is also capable of assisting in lateral movements and privilege escalations. Attacks like Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, Over-Pass-the-Hash, Kerberoasting etc. can also be achieved with Mimikatz.

Mimikatz Attack Capabilities

Mimikatz has numerous modules that let attackers perform a variety of tasks on the target endpoint. Some of the more important attacks facilitated by the platform are:

  • Pass-the-Hash—obtains an NTLM hash used by Windows to deliver passwords. This allows attackers to reuse the password without having to crack the hash.

  • Pass-the-Ticket—Mimikatz was famously used to break the Kerberos protocol. It can obtain a Kerberos “ticket” for a user account and use it to login as that user on another computer.

  • Kerberos Golden Ticket—obtains the ticket for the hidden root account (KRBTGT) that encrypts all authentication tickets, granting domain admin access for any computer on the network.

  • Kerberos Silver Ticket—exploits Windows functionality that grants a user a ticket to access multiple services on the network (via the Ticket Granting Server or TGS). The Kerberos protocol may not check the TGS key, allowing attackers to reuse the key and impersonate the user on the network.

  • Pass the Key—obtains a unique key used by a user to authenticate to a domain controller. The attacker can reuse this key to impersonate the user.

Anatomy of a Mimikatz Attack:

Mimikatz abuses and exploits the Single Sign-On functionality of Windows Authentication that allows the user to authenticate himself only once in order to use various Windows services. 

After a user logs into Windows, a set of credentials is generated and stored in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) in the memory. As the LSASS is loaded in memory, when invoked mimikatz loads its dynamic link library (dll) into the library from where it can extract the credential hashes and dumps them onto the attacking system, and might even give us cleartext passwords.






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